Purpose -The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), organizational change and performance. It explores the processes by which privatization affects corporate performance through the internal changes within organizations in a developing country context. Design/methodology/approach -The methodology involved the use of a survey questionnaire. Responses were obtained from 86 managers in 86 organizations, comprised of SOEs, privatized firms and private enterprises in Indonesia. Findings -Cross-sectional analysis shows that there had been a statistical significant difference across the types of ownership pertaining to organizational elements that were expected to change. The evidence suggested that privatization brought about important alignments among the organization's goals, design elements and resources and between the organization and its competitive environment. Practical implications -The implications of the study are discussed in relation to the organizational changes that take place in the transition from public to private sector ownership. The study contributes to our understanding about the relationship between ownership-performance by providing an organizational change perspective on the examination of privatization-performance effect. Originality/value -The paper provides insights into how privatization processes alter the behavior, incentives and performance of formerly SOEs in Indonesia.
Introduction to the study Privatization has become a global phenomenon and is still among the top priorities in the policy agenda of developing and transitional countries. Privatization has been conceptualized in a broad and narrow sense (Ramamurti, 2000) . In the broad sense, it refers to any shift of activities or particularly the production of goods and services function from the public to private sector. This includes outsourcing, contracting-out, franchising, privatization of public finance, liberalization and the sale of state property to the private sector (Heald, 1984; Pirie, 1985) . In the narrow sense, privatization represents the sale of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to the private sector (Ramamurti, 2000) . The general definition of privatization, advocated by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, usually refers to denationalization, particularly the sale of state property to the private sector, including the direct sale of the whole or parts of SOEs to private agents and share issue privatizations (SIPs). This study, unless specifically stated, adopts the general definition of privatization, that is, the sale of SOEs to the private sector.
Beginning with Margaret Thatcher's Conservative government in the UK at the end of the 1970s, privatization rapidly and forcefully spreads over the whole world, including Latin American and Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia Pacific and former Soviet-bloc countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Hodge, 2000) . The privatization initiatives of the last 30 years have significantly reduced the role of SOEs in the economic life of many countries. Most of this reduction occurred in developing countries in the 1990s. The SOEs share of "global GDP" has declined from more than 10 percent in 1979 to less than 6 percent in 2001 (Megginson and Netter, 2001) .
Privatization is a vehicle for foreign direct investment (FDI). FDI flows into developing countries grew from $23.7 billion in 1990 to $166 billion in 1998, a seven-fold increase, helping to contribute to growth in the stock of FDI in developing countries from 5 to 20.5 percent of gross domestics product (GDP) (United Nations, 1999) . Turning to the infrastructure sector, for example, investment flows to projects with private participation grew dramatically in developing countries between 1990 and 1997, from about $16 to $120 billion (World Bank, 1999) . The World Bank Group's Privatization Database showed that privatization in 62 developing countries continued to pick up in 2004 and 2005 , with 400 transactions worth about US$90 billion (World Bank, 2007) . Privatization is an irreversible fact for most developing countries.
Theoretical and empirical research has already established the link between changes in ownership (privatization) and corporate performance (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988; Boardman and Vinning, 1989; Galal et al., 1994; Megginson et al., 1994; Martin and Parker, 1997; Megginson and Netter, 2001 ), but it is less clear how privatization influences organizational change and managerial practices within a firm, and in turn, corporate performance (Parker, 1995; Zahra et al., 2000; Cuervo and Villalonga, 2000; Cunha and Cooper, 2002; Viverita and Ariff, 2004) .
Organizational level responses to privatization have not been widely studied (Doh, 2000; Zahra et al., 2000) . The enormous changes in organizational behavior, strategy and structures, systems and incentives (i.e. changes in the "black box") need to be systematically and thoroughly studied in order to gain insights into the transformation processes of SOEs (Martin and Parker, 1997; Zahra et al., 2000; Cuervo and Villalonga, 2000) . The key argument in this paper is that only those privatization policies that bring about positive organizational changes fundamentally different from SOEs and suitable to a competitive market environment lead to improved firm performance.
The aim of this study is to investigate the changes that privatization trigger within privatized firms. The study attempts to explore three identified organizational and managerial implications of privatization in Indonesia, namely: goals and objectives, corporate governance practices and organizational structure. The analysis identifies three fruitful avenues of research: first, general theoretical and conceptual frameworks in the extant literature that associate privatization with organizational changes and practices; second, empirical studies that examine organizational changes and practices resulting from the privatization of SOEs in developing economy contexts; and third, policy implications for the privatization of SOEs and the management of public enterprises in Indonesia and developing countries.
The study is based on Indonesia's experience in public enterprise restructuring and privatization programs. The Indonesian SOE sector has recently undergone restructuring and privatization programs. The choice of Indonesia as a candidate JOCM 23, 5 for studying the relationship between ownership change, organizational change and performance in a developing country is justified for a number of reasons. First, for historical and economic reasons, Indonesia has built-up large SOEs, which have played a significance role in the economy. The size, scale and scope of SOEs have expanded over time since Indonesia's independence in 1945 and they have become a central part in the country's development strategy. The size of public enterprise is large and accounted for approximately 15 percent of GDP in 1995. At this time, SOEs employed approximately one million employees, equivalent to 1.4 percent of the labor force (World Bank, 1994) or equivalent to 25 percent of the Indonesia's civil servants in 1992 (Hill, 2000) . Not only have SOEs employed the large numbers of employees, but they have also operated in some of the most important industries such as electricity, cement, telecommunications, banks and insurance, finance, transport, agriculture, consultancy services, construction, energy, aircraft, ships and ports. SOEs provide essential raw materials and dominate capital-intensive sectors as power, steel, chemicals and machinery (Latifulhayat, 2008; Zhang et al., 2008) . Thus, public enterprise reforms and privatization affect multiple stakeholders including public enterprise managers, employees, the government and society at large (Adams and Mengistu, 2008) .
Second, an appropriate amount of time has elapsed since the early privatization initiatives in 1991 to begin to explore and assess the organizational and performance implications of privatization programs. Third, though recognizing the importance of privatization in increasing firms' efficiency, Indonesia has been relatively cautious in its privatization efforts. Only six of its 125 SOEs had been partially privatized through initial public offerings by 2003. Therefore, privatization in Indonesia is still in its infancy and its validity as part of a long-term development strategy is still being actively debated. This study, concerned with the organizational implications of privatization, will add perspectives to those debating the consequences of privatization in Indonesia.
Finally, there is a need to analyze, at the micro-institutional level, organizational change and the transformation of Indonesia's SOEs (Aswicahyono et al., 2009) . Research on the impact of privatization on organizational change and performance would help managers understand the nature of the transformation process, taking place during ownership change. An important by-product of privatization and public enterprise restructuring programs in Indonesia is the growing demand for effective managers in both SOEs and privatized firms.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section takes the form of a review of relevant literature on organizational and managerial implications of privatization. It presents the theoretical frameworks of the study and outlines the general proposition of the analysis. Following this review, the methodology and empirical findings of the study are presented together with a concluding discussion.
Theoretical framework: organizational and managerial implications of privatization In explaining organizational and managerial implications of privatization, there are three theoretical foundations that have been taken from economic and organization research. These foundations relate to agency, public choice and property rights (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988; Martin and Parker, 1997; Hodge, 2000) . These central theoretical foundations are captured in Table I . On balance, privatization theories centrally posit that privatization increases corporate performance (that is, the firm's efficiency), though they Organizational change and performance
say little about what happened within organizations in the search for that corporate performance. However, privatization theories indicate potential organizational and managerial implications of privatization, that is, the changes in managerial incentives, corporate governance and organizational structures. The content of organizational changes as a result of privatization is mainly unexplored. Both agency and public choice theorists, for example, anticipate that privatization will induce changes in managerial incentives, corporate governance and information and control systems. Agency theorists focus on the different agency problems and solutions to them that are available under each form of ownership. The theory argues that the agent (management) is assumed to have a divergent goal (often conflicting goals) with the owners (principals). The so-called "agency problems" can be more effectively alleviated in private ownership through its most efficient information and incentive structure (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Berle and Means, 1932) .
It has been argued that private enterprises have developed better mechanisms in solving agency problems through external control mechanisms (for example, markets for manager, capital and corporate control) and internal control mechanisms (for example, managerial participation in ownership, reward systems and the board of directors) (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) . Vickers and Yarrow (1988) argue that these control mechanisms (external and internal) are virtually absent in the SOE sector. Cuervo and Villalonga (2000) claim that the owner-manager relationship is broken down into two agency relationships, the first being the public as owners-to-politicians and the second the public being politicians-to-managers, which effectively weaken the control mechanisms.
Public choice theorists focus more on the agency problems in SOEs between the public and the politicians. Politicians might impose political, economic and social goals over SOEs (Buchanan, 1972; Niskanen, 1971) . For the public, the cost of the state's monitoring of public enterprises is likely offset the benefits of state ownership of these Berle and Means (1932) , Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama and Jensen (1983) Goal conflicts between the agent and the principal Information asymmetry People's behavior are assumed
Changes in managerial incentives Changes in corporate governance Changes in control systems Public choice theory Buchanan (1972) , Niskanen (1971) and Tullock (1965) Business maximize profits Government managers maximize their budget Politicians maximize their votes Less political intervention Increasing search for efficiency Reducing social considerations Property rights theory Alchian (1965) , Demsetz (1966) , Lindlom (1977 ), De Alessi (1980 and Vickers and Yarrow (1988) The more direct and unattenuated are the rights to property, the better the assets will be used Incentives for management Clear lines of accountability Commercially oriented Source: Author's compilation (Cuervo and Villalonga, 2000) . This is not the case for other interest groups such as unions and politically connected people or institutions (for example, military groups in Indonesia) where SOEs are an easy target for rent-seeking activities. Hence, public choice theory attributes the inefficiency of SOEs to its vulnerability to detrimental intervention of self-interested maximizing politicians or bureaucrats.
Furthermore, property rights theorists argue that the more direct and less attenuated are the rights to property the better the assets will be used (Hodge, 2000) . For example, Lindlom (1977, p. 26) stated: "Property is a set of rights to control assets". Martin and Parker (1997) argue that the property rights literature places heavy emphasis upon the attenuation of property rights where public ownership exists. The basic prediction from those who hold the property rights view of privatization is that private organizations in which rights to profits are clearly defined will perform better than those in the public sector where rights are diffused and uncertain (Alchian, 1965; De Alessi, 1980) . It is argued by these writers that property rights uniquely featured in private ownership create incentives for profitability.
Therefore, central to the basic prediction of privatization theories about efficiency improvement is the assumption that a change in ownership and the introduction of competition will trigger significant change within the privatized firms, making them more responsive to external demands and creating more incentives for management to search out internal cost savings. Agency, public choice and property rights theory provides a strong indication that privatization is likely to alter the basic elements of SOEs, that is, the firm's goals and objectives, corporate governance practices, incentives structures and control, strategy and organizational structures. The impact of privatization on corporate performance (efficiency) hinges on the changes of those organizational characteristics (Martin and Parker, 1997; Andrew and Dowling, 1998; Cuervo and Villalonga, 2000; Zahra et al., 2000) .
Agency, property rights and public choice theory offers a theoretical basis for the expectations presented in the conceptual framework shown in Figure 1 . Overall, this study argues that both economic theory and organization theory predict that only those privatization policies that bring about positive organizational changes fundamentally different from SOEs and suitable to competitive market environment lead to sustainable efficiency improvement. Goals, corporate governance practices, organizational structure and integration are expected to change as firms move from public to private.
In the light of this research framework, the study seeks to provide answers to the following research questions: RQ3. What changes have been taken place in organization structure and integration since privatization?
Hypothesis development
One area in which SOEs can be differentiated from the private enterprises is the nature of their goals and objectives (Martin and Parker, 1997) . In typical analyses of agency costs in SOEs, researchers rely on the assertion that managers in SOEs focus on the objectives of politicians, rather than maximize enterprise efficiency (Boycko et al., 1996) . In SOEs, the goals are blurred, multiple, conflicting and unstable and include both financial and political objectives. This view is well established in the literature (Parker, 1995; Boycko et al., 1996) . However, it has been widely acknowledged that the goal in private firms is clearer and related to profit maximization and value creation for shareholders (Martin and Parker, 1997) . Martin and Parker (1997) contend that apart from commercial goals, some SOEs may include macro-economic goals concerned with some issues as employment, inflation, equity and so forth. This is certainly true in the Indonesian case where SOEs are viewed as a business entity and the government tool to realise macro-economic objectives. Aharoni (1986) added that in private firms, managers' main goals are the pursuit of long-term profits for their shareholders. SOEs are predicted to be low performers because politicians impose objectives on them which may help them gain votes but conflict with efficiency and customer orientation (Buchanan, 1974; Niskanen, 1971) .
Following privatization, senior managers have discretion to redefine organizational goals to reflect the objectives of their key stakeholders (Yarrow, 1986) . A new dynamic would occur by freeing political intervention and facing a new environment. This will stipulate firms should put more emphasis on commercial activities and maximize enterprise efficiency (Martin and Parker, 1997) . The new goals may reflect a change in power relationships in the organization (Parker, 1995) . As firms move from public to private, it is expected that privatization changes organizational mission and goals that put more emphasis on the search for the efficiency, customer satisfaction and reduce social consideration (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994) .
In SOEs such as in Indonesia, the goals and objectives may change frequently with consequent loss of consistency in strategic direction. This loss of strategic direction is usually as a result of frequent changes at the top level of the organization; brought about by shifts in policy by the political party in power or changes in the minister responsible for the SOEs. Following the privatization process, a reduced turnover at top management level will likely lead to some sense of stability with consequent continuity in strategic direction. To this end, public choice and agency theorists emphasise goals and controls as the central variables upon which the privatization-performance relationship hinges (Cuervo and Villalonga, 2000) .
In light of the above review, the following hypothesis is offered: JOCM 23,5
H1. As firms move from public to private, the organizational goals and objectives change toward a greater emphasis on commercial, efficiency and customer focus goals.
From a corporate governance view, the benefits of ownership change could be explained in several ways. First, managers in privatized firms have to achieve a successful transfer from public to private governance and must implement numerous policies in order to achieve expected gains in performance (Cuervo and Villalonga, 2000) . Managers should develop strategies based on analysis of industry and market and technological opportunities. Following privatization, managers are expected to have the discretion to redefine the organizational goals to reflect the objectives of their key stakeholders (Yarrow, 1986) . Second, the benefit of privatization can be achieved by delegating management functions to professional managers who have the required training and knowledge at all levels of the company. The separation of ownership and management could, however, encourage management to be largely unaccountable to equity holders and to pursue its own interests at the shareholders' expense (agency costs). Privatized companies could develop internal and external control mechanisms that reduce the losses associated with the separation of ownership from management (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) . Internal control mechanisms in which incentives and monitoring devices are established encourage professional managers to act in the shareholders' best interest. When internal control mechanisms work well, the board of directors changes the top management as needed in the best interest of the corporation. When internal control mechanisms are deficient, however, external control mechanisms (through stock prices, takeovers and relation-based control) may be used to realign managers' interests with those of investors (Cuervo and Villalonga, 2000) .
As predicted in agency theory, control mechanisms in private firms can be expected to be more effective than those in SOEs, since the internal control departments and boards of directors who exercise control in private firms usually are better informed than their counterparts in SOEs (Dharwadkar et al., 2000) . The objectives of boards and internal control departments are also more aligned to those of firm owners' than are the objectives of external agencies in general.
Third, the characteristics of corporate governance may change the manner in which the government influences SOEs. It has been widely accepted that the degree of external and political intervention in the public sector is usually higher than the private sector. This makes SOEs very susceptible to arbitrary political involvement by ministers, politicians and public servants. Public managers elsewhere have to report to different ministers and inspectors. They have to consult with technical ministers for some decisions involving huge sum of financial outlay. Their operations are scrutinized and controlled by different agencies in the government. Some of the controls are financial in nature, specifying performance quotas and targets. As Parker (2000) argues, it is difficult to distinguish who the principal is for an SOE. This creates a complexity in decision making and confusion for managers. Managers of SOEs usually have limited discretion to initiate and implement strategic changes (Martin and Parker, 1997) and are constrained by bureaucratic controls that limit their scope of activities and authority.
Another expected shift in the corporate governance practices is a change in criteria of the boards' appointment. The overhaul of top-level management in the privatized Organizational change and performance firms is expected (Martin and Parker, 1997; Cuervo and Villalonga, 2000) in order to achieve a successful transformation from public sector mindset to private sector culture. Managers with private sector experiences -equipped by necessary skills in business development and venture, marketing and finance -are needed to capitalise on market and technological opportunities. The appointment of top level management in newly privatized firms would be based on past experience in commerce rather than those with influence and political connections. In Indonesia, the president through the Ministry of Finance has effective powers to appoint the board of commissioners and board of directors of all SOEs. SOEs have often been used as employment creation for politicians. Fifth, a study by Gupta (2005) contended that in the private sector corporate governance mechanisms often ensure that managerial behavior is monitored and controlled through market mechanisms such as share prices, prospective investors and the media. This may explain why SIPs can lead to a significant impact on the efficiency of the enterprises. However, researchers have underlined that developing countries lack market-supporting institutions. In this case, managers may rely largely on layoffs and on increasing sales to bring companies to profitability. Even when widely dispersed and individually weak shareholders intend to replace incumbent management, they lack the ability to attract appropriately qualified managerial candidates, and they generally fail to provide management with the support it needs to implement drastic turnaround in operations and in culture (Dharwadkar et al., 2000) . Cook and Kirkpatrick (1988) pointed out a number of reasons why privatization in the form of a change of ownership may have a significant impact on the productive efficiency of enterprises. They concluded that the change in ownership will: first, lessen the scope for political intervention in the operation of enterprises and simplify objectives; second, improve the incentives for productive efficiency performance; and third, impose the discipline of the private capital market on the enterprise, thereby improving productive efficiency.
In relation to Indonesia on the "political intervention" point, for example, the Ministry of Finance along side the technical minister have to approve all strategic moves such as diversification, geographic growth, human resource management, product change and leadership change through a bureaucratic system that foils any resemblance of proactive strategy making. The governance of SOEs is merely a bureaucratic system, frequently composed of administrators that emphasise control, either through the political agenda or trivial issues such as line-item budgetary expenditures, maintenance or procurement procedures.
To this end, privatization is expected to shift corporate governance practices as the SOE becomes a typical private sector company. Having considered the above literature, in order to explore some aspect of corporate governance this work argues that:
H2. Privatization will lead to improved corporate governance characteristics in order to support the new organizational objectives. The level of political influence is expected to decline in strategic decision making and board appointments will be based on professionalism.
Successful organizations are known to be remarkably consistent in their ability to be able to achieve a viable alignment with their relevant environment (Hamel and Prahalad, 1994) . Organizational structure that facilitates faster decision making and JOCM 23,5
integrates individuals/units in the organization is important following privatization. Donaldson (1996) defines organizational structure as the recurrent relationships between the various members of an organization. The organizational structure formally and informally identifies: authority and reporting relationships; who has resources; who is accountable for what; and how knowledge flows around the organization. It is a central task for the organization to implement its strategy and accomplish its objectives. Donaldson (2001) mentioned that the dominant approach to structure has been grounded in contingency theory. The heart of the argument is that the best form of structure depends upon the particular demands (contingencies) faced by an organization. Wide ranges of contingencies have appeared in the literature such as: organizational size (Pugh and Hickson, 1976) ; operational technology (Woodward, 1965) ; organizational environment (Donaldson, 2001) ; diversification strategy (Chandler, 1962) ; internationalization (Stopford and Wells, 1972) . In brief, structure is a key component in the web of factors determining organizational performance (Whittington, 2003, p. 323) . The extent to which organizational structure might change because of privatization remains an open debate, in fact, it has not yet been clarified in the organizational literature. Thus, the question arises, what are the changes in the organizational structures in the post-privatization period?
The stereotype of public enterprises structure is that SOEs are bureaucratic, inflexible, rigid and unable to adapt to the external environment. Politically controlled bodies have politically defined structures (Parker, 1995; Martin and Parker, 1997 ) -these are likely to be non-optimal after privatization. Therefore, it is expected that as firms move from public to private, there will be a change in organizational structure (Parker, 1995) . Furthermore, drawing upon the field of managerial economics and strategy writers, Parker contended that privatization is associated with a movement from a functional form of organization to control inputs and outputs for the whole organization and usually requiring activities arranged in profit or cost centres. Privatization is associated with the move to a flattening of the managerial pyramid and an "m-form", rather "u-form" structure (Martin and Parker, 1997) .
Furthermore, by releasing managers from politicians' control; privatization may free managers to exercise their latent managerial talent (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994) . Middle-level managers, for example, whose main role under state ownership was one of mere administrative control, might find their jobs content changed as they become responsible for implementing changes and for coordinating and motivating the teams they supervise.
According to Zahra et al. (2000) , Parker (1995) and Cuervo and Villalonga (2000) privatized companies also change their organizational structures to ensure faster decision making by eliminating layers of management and reducing bureaucratic rules, and integrating individuals/units in the organization. Flatter organizational structures, therefore, are more common in privatized companies, and they usually facilitate communication and cooperation between individual and units. Improved communication can strengthen employee commitment to the organization, encouraging employees to be more productive and innovative.
Having considered the above discussion, the following hypothesis is offered:
H3. Privatization prompts the firm to adopt a flatter and more decentralized organizational structure that facilitates a faster decision-making process.
Organizational change and performance

Research methods
The study was conducted in Indonesia, where the early 1990s witnessed the government of Indonesia espousing and introducing market liberalization and privatization initiatives. The study sought to investigate the organizational and managerial implications of privatization through examining and comparing organizational and managerial characteristics between SOEs, partial private/privatized firms and full private enterprises. As captured in the conceptual framework, three identified potential impacts of privatization have been selected, namely: goals and objectives, corporate governance and organizational structure. The findings presented in this paper were drawn from primary data from mailed survey questionnaire results. In the absence of archival data, particularly of organizational and managerial implications of privatization, self-reported measures are acceptable and are often equally reliable provided that data reliability is examined (Nath and Gruca, 1997) . The questionnaire was administered to SOEs, privatized firms and private enterprises.
Privatized firms populations were a "rare case" in Indonesia; there were only six privatized firms until 2002, including telecommunications, bank, cement and mining sectors. There were 125 SOEs and 324 private enterprises in the Jakarta Stock Exchange ( JSX) in 2002. The questionnaires were sent to all organizations: with a cover letter explaining the purpose of the study and promising confidentiality. The organizations were offered a summary of the study on request and returned envelopes addressed to the researcher were attached. Follow-up actions through e-mail and mail were undertaken two weeks after the postage date if no response had been obtained. The whole process was conducted entirely by the researcher.
The survey questionnaire contained 31 items pertaining to the organizations' general characteristics and the six identified generic groups: goals and objectives, corporate governance and organizational structure, together with the three core theoretical constructs of privatization theory. The performance data were based on the managers' judgment. This self-reported performance may be judged as a subjective measure, but previous studies found that there is a strong correlation between self-reported performance and actual data (Dess and Robison, 1984) . The "subjective" method (self-reported performance through survey) has also been employed to capture performance in previous studies in transitional economies (Peng et al., 2004) .
The cross-sectional survey was conducted in January-July 2004. The respondents were drawn from the top management of the organizations. By virtue of their position, they were the most knowledgeable of the organizational and managerial aspects of the impact of privatization. A total of 49 private, six privatized and 31 public enterprises (86 organizations) returned the completed questionnaire by the cut-off date in late July 2004. This yielded a response rate of approximately 20 percent.
Given the difficulties of obtaining responses to mailed surveys in Indonesia and the relative controversy of privatization concepts and implementation, the response rate was encouraging both in terms of actual number and percentage. For example, a recent survey study on corporate governance in Indonesia utilized responses from 66 organizations (Nam and Nam, 2004) . Fahy et al. (2003) achieved a 20-percent response rate in a study involving SOEs and privatized firms. Gowland and Aiken (2003) surveyed the executives of 28 organizations in Australia. Martin and Parker (1997) JOCM 23,5 used seven privatized organizations in the UK. Cunha and Cooper (2002) utilized responses from two in the cement industry and one in the pulp industry in Portugal.
Responses and information obtained from the questionnaire survey were processed by the statistical package for social science version 13.01.1 and analyzed using both descriptive and inferential statistical methods. Two pre-analysis tests were undertaken to generalize the results of the questionnaire (non-response bias analysis) and to measure its internal consistency (Cronbach's Alpha). In the non-response bias test, early respondents were compared with late respondents (as a surrogate of those who did not respond to the questionnaire). After conducting the Mann-Whitney U test, no significant difference was reported between the two groups. The Cronbach's Alpha test, however, was used to assess the relationship between different constructs in the questionnaire. The Cronbach's Alpha coefficients range between 0 and 1; where 0 indicates no correlation exists between various parts of the questionnaire and 1 refers to perfect correlation between them. Huck and Cormier (1996) indicated that 0.70 is an acceptable level of significance for Alpha. Botosan (1997) , however, indicated that 0.80 or more is preferable. In all cases, Table III shows that the value of Cronbach's Alpha for each variable is over 0.70.
The unit of analysis of this study was the organization. This analysis was based on the respondents' perceptions of various organizational dimensions amongst SOEs, partially privatized and private enterprises. Three levels of analysis were used in this study:
(1) Totally SOEs/public enterprises.
(2) Partially privatized/partial private. (3) Totally private enterprises.
To accommodate small sub-sample sizes and resulting non-normal distributions, which together would violate the assumptions of parametric statistics, the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis analysis of variance was chosen (Kruskal and Wallis, 1952; Vargha and Delaney, 1998) . Previous studies in the field of organizational and business studies (Al-Khater and Naser, 2003; Bishop and Megicks, 2002; Frank et al., 2001; Fraser and Zarkada-Fraser, 2003; Okabe, 2002) have used Kruskal-Wallis tests.
Findings
General characteristics of the samples
The attributes of samples are reported as a percentage distribution. The type of business and ownership, annual sales, age, products/services sold abroad and respondents' general characteristics are presented in Table II . Basic industry and chemicals, finance and trade, services and investment companies represent approximately 55 percent of the samples. Others account for about 4-12 percent of the sample. The study covers both manufacturing and services sectors in Indonesia.
Ownership types of organization. Of 86 respondents in 86 organizations, 31 are top and senior managers working for the SOEs, six are senior managers working for privatized firms and the remaining 49 are executives/management of private enterprises. There are fewer privatized firms than the other types of organization. This is natural in the context of Indonesia, since only those organizations privatized before December 31, 2002 were considered in this study. There were no responses from organizations characterized as wholly foreign owned. Furthermore, private enterprises were listed firms in the JSX (publicly traded companies). This should be borne in mind when analyzing and interpreting the data. Annual sales. Table II illustrates the size of the organization, measured by average net sales. It shows that 27.7 percent recorded more than one trillion Rupiah for the last five years. While about 50 percent have average net sales ranging from 100 billion to one trillion Rupiah, 23 percent recorded net average sales below 100 billion Rupiah. It can be said that most of the studied organizations have large annual sales by Indonesian standards.
Age of organizations. The number of years in business ranges from three years (the required minimum for inclusion in the study) to 114 years. The mean number of years in business is 30, and the standard deviation is 17. Nearly, 85 percent of the surveyed organizations had been in business for ten to 50 years. About 34 organizations started their operation 31-50 years ago. Only six organizations had been operating for more than 50 years.
Products sold abroad. The degree of internationalization implies greater competitiveness and an ability to increase market size. Using the crude indicator of percentage of products/services sold abroad, 58 percent of the sampled firms (50 companies) sold their products/services in the domestic market only. About 19 firms sold up to 25 percent of their products/services to foreign markets, and seven organizations, with a high degree of internationalization, exported more than 75 percent of their products/services. Hence, the majority of studied organizations sold their products and services only in the domestic market in Indonesia.
Respondents' profiles. Table II shows that 56 percent of the respondents were categorized as a senior vice president or vice director. General managers represent 21.4 percent of the total sample, while president directors and directors are 8.3 and 14.3 percent, respectively. Top management was targeted under the assumption that this group of managers have a comprehensive understanding about both the endogenous characteristics and external environment of the organization. We confirmed that our actual respondents do represent their own organizations.
Most respondents (53.6 percent) held postgraduate certificates, whilst about 42 percent had an undergraduate educational background. Thus, the majority of respondents had experienced higher education, and more than 50 percent had studied at postgraduate level. On average, respondents had been working in their organization for 11.8 years. This offers some degree of assurance that they knew about the organization they represented, and the information given is reliable, as shown by the Cronbach Alpha value of above 0.7 (Table III) .
Ownership change and organizational goals and objectives A Kruskal-Wallis test (H Test) was performed to examine whether firms across ownership type significantly differ in their organizational goals and objectives, characteristics of corporate governance and organizational structure. The survey results are presented in Table III . Table III demonstrates that there is no significant difference across ownership types concerning the importance attached to profitability, firms' growth, financial stability, employment welfare and social responsibility goals. The mean scores show that all of these organizational goals are highly valued irrespective of ownership type. However, the organizations had statistically significant differences in the mean rank regarding the importance assigned to the "efficiency and cost control" goal (H ¼ 6.630, p , 0.05) and "products" quality and customer services' (customer focus) goal, with H statistics of 6.103 and p , 0.05. The results suggest that the managerial incentives for efficiency and customer orientation were systematically higher in the privatized and private enterprises as compared to those for the SOEs. However, the pronounced difference in efficiency and cost-effective goals exists between privatized enterprises and SOEs. Privatized enterprises have a mean score of 6 on a scale of 6, while SOEs have a mean score of 5.39 on a scale of six. This is also evident in the products and quality goals where a significant difference exists between privatized enterprises and SOEs.
The survey results validate the H1 that as firms move from public to private, the managerial emphasis on efficiency, cost reductions and customer orientation increases.
Ownership change and corporate governance
The characteristics of corporate governance covered in the survey were the audit committee and its independence of management, related party transactions, political interference on decision-making process and the appointment of board members.
Audit committee
The role of the audit committee is crucial to develop internal and external organizational control mechanisms to reduce the risks of mismanagement. Table IV exhibits a significant difference in the existence of audit committees between SOEs, partially privatized and private enterprises. All privatized and private enterprises (100 percent) have an audit committee, while the audit committee only existed in 35.5 percent of SOEs.
The independence of an audit committee is a crucial factor. The independence in this case is met when at least one of the three members of the audit committee is independent of management, with no ownership and conflicting interests. The majority of managers Organizational change and performance in privatized and private enterprises (over 93 percent) indicated that the audit committee was independent of management and responsible to the boards of commissioners (Table IV) . The management of SOEs, which have an audit committee, indicated that the independence of the audit committee was seriously undermined: 70 percent of respondents said that the audit committee was not independent of management. As indicated by the Pearson x 2 test, there is a significant difference pertaining to the independence of audit committee across ownership type.
Related party transactions
The Pearson x 2 in Table IV shows that there is no significant variation pertaining to related party transactions across ownership type. First, the majority of respondents (over 80 percent) across ownership types indicated that their organization did not have contracts with directors, commissioners or shareholders, which can promote conflicts of interests. Second, the proportion of privatized and private enterprises allocating loans to their subsidiary companies was slightly higher than SOEs. Half of the privatized firms provide loans to their subsidiaries, while 57.1 percent of private enterprises do not allocate loans to the subsidiaries. Table III , two findings are of special interests. First, there is a significant difference across ownership types regarding the importance of the government in the strategic decision making (H ¼ 27.49, p , 0.005). The mean rank column shows that SOEs had the highest mean rank, while private enterprises reported the lowest. This indicates that the SOEs' strategic decision making is highly political and influenced by the government.
Political interference Based on
Second, regarding the degree of importance attached to the boards' appointment criteria (Table III) , there are significant variances across ownership types in such criteria as "the importance of business networks, skills and experiences" (H ¼ 10.077, p , 0.005), "reputation" (H ¼ 9.317, p , 0.005), "Ministry of SOEs" (H ¼ 56.586, p , 0.005). It appears that privatized firms had the highest means rank on the importance of "business networks, skills and experiences" and "reputation" in appointing their boards, while SOEs reported the lowest.
In sum, the findings provide support to H2, that privatization leads to improved corporate governance characteristics in order to support the new organizational objectives. The level of political influence was declined in strategic decision making and board appointments were based on market criteria or professionalism.
Ownership change and organizational structure K-W Statistics (Table III) reveal no significant differences across various type of ownership with respect to the openness of internal communication and cooperation between individuals and units. Openness of internal communication and cooperation between individuals and units is highly rated by the respondents irrespective of ownership type. The respondents are of the opinion that roles and functions are clearly defined; regulation and procedures are in place for employees to perform; information and help are made available for all employees.
However, pronounced differences were observed pertaining to the organizational structure, with H statistics of 7.937 ( p , 0.05). The question concerned the flatness and JOCM 23,5 decentralization of the organizational structure. An inspection of the mean rank shows that privatized enterprises recorded the highest, while private enterprises reported the lowest. The finding supports H3, that privatization leads to a flatter and decentralized organizational structure.
Ownership change and corporate performance Table V reveals the proportion of firms reporting an increase and significant increase in their corporate performance against the firms' close competitors over the last five years.
Across all types of performance indicators, improvements are recorded in the privatized enterprises, partly indicating the important role of privatization in enhancing corporate performance. For example, the proportion of privatized firms that reported an increase in profitability (80 percent) was significantly greater than for SOEs (58.1 percent). However, it is also evident from Table V that privatization is associated with a decline in the total number of employees. Only a third of privatized firms reported an increase in the number of their employees in their post-privatization era. It is also interesting to note that the proportion of privatized firms recording a significant increase in their performance was slightly greater than for private enterprises, except for the variables number in employment and products/services quality.
Furthermore, the Kruskal-Wallis tests (Table III) show that firms significantly differ across ownership types in profitability, number in employment, products and services and quality performance relative to competitors over the last five years. There are no significant variances across privatization levels with respect to "investment/total assets" and "market share relative to competitors" over the last five years.
Discussions
This research provides insight into how organizational changes that accompany privatization process influence the financial performance of privatized firms. The study found pronounced variations between public and privatized enterprises in the importance attached to efficiency, cost effectiveness (cost control) and customer-focused goals. Managerial incentives were increased after privatization in the search for efficiency, cost control and improvement of product and service quality. This was especially true in privatized firms, for example, telecommunication companies (Telkom Indonesia) , where there was a shift from "engineering excellence" to "customer excellence". From the public service mentality of government departments and the dominance of technical experts, privatized firms went through significant changes in the number and structure of employees, and radical transformation of management systems towards customer-oriented behavior, teamwork practices and shareholder value policies. The effects of privatization on the characteristics of corporate governance were found to be significant in relation to perceived improvements to both the external and internal control mechanisms of organizations. Significant differences were found in corporate governance practices between SOEs and privatized enterprises, particularly in terms of the existence of audit committees that were independent from management. Furthermore, privatized and private enterprises were more likely to disclose company information, for instance, in related party transactions and reward systems. Privatization also lessened the room for political interference in the strategic decisionmaking process and the appointment of boards of directors and commissioners. For example, in privatized firms, the government, although a majority shareholder, appointed "apolitical", commercial boards of directors. Boards were given the responsibility for strategic direction and commercial performance, with incentives based on commercial performance indicators. All of these changes led to increased managerial discretion in the entrepreneurship transformation.
Undoubtedly, the role of an audit committee is crucial, particularly after the economic crisis of 1997-1998, as recognized by Indonesia's National Committee on Corporate Governance (1999). In January 2005, NCGP embarked on a strategic plan to revamp all SOEs, financial service providers and private and public companies and to devise codes of conduct, ensure implementation, recommend regulatory improvements and provide management assessment procedures using World Bank and organization for economic cooperation and development benchmarks. When an audit committee is present, privatized and private companies are more likely to be able to develop the internal and external control mechanisms that reduce losses associated with the separation of principals from agents. Internal control mechanisms, in which incentives and monitoring devices are established, encourage professional managers to act in the shareholders' best interest (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) . It is evident in this study that political interference and weak internal and external control mechanisms have been complicated by the absence of an audit committee in the majority of SOEs.
Furthermore, based on Indonesia's security exchange commission regulation, the auditing firms (external auditors) can only audit firms that have traded their shares on the stock exchange (that is, the privatized firms and private enterprises) for a maximum of five years. If there is no auditing period limitation, some auditing firms might collude with their clients' management to improve their chances of continuing the auditing services (Nam and Nam, 2004) . A five-year maximum regulation has improved the reliability and independence of auditing by external auditors in privatized and private enterprises. Nevertheless, there has been no legal requirement for SOEs to have an external auditing period limitation.
The quality of corporate internal controls and supervising process in the private and privatized firms, as indicated by the presence of an independent audit committee, is relatively stronger than those in SOEs. Privatization is associated with the improvement of corporate governance practices as implied by the internal controls and supervising process dimensions.
Approval and disclosure are needed in relation to related party transactions in the case of those amounting to at least 10 percent of corporate revenue or 20 percent of equity for both private and privatized enterprises.
As noted earlier, privatization changes both the decision-making process and the degree of government influence on the decision making in strategic decisions. Therefore, the change in ownership was expected to lessen the scope for political intervention in the operation of the enterprises and to simplify the objectives (Cook and Kirkpatrick, 1988) . In Indonesia, for example, the government not only determines managerial life spans, but also controls key resources, market channels and sources of raw materials for SOEs' operations.
Political influence in any form constrains the SOEs' managerial actions to implement strategic changes. The result suggests that as firms move from public to private, the forms of political influence are systematically reduced. It would be wrong to say that there is no kind of political influence in the privatized firms. In all privatized company, the government has kept saham dwiwarna (golden share), which gives the government the right to veto major decisions pertaining to "very crucial issues". This is one form of political influence. However, because of the privatization method chosen (SIPs), the stock market can play a role in which the company has to disclose any material issues regarding the company's operation. Stock Exchange (Badan Pengelola dan Pengawasan Pasar Modal ) regulations to some extent constrain the government's political influence.
The results suggest that the boards' appointment in privatized firms is based on professionalism criteria such as business reputation, experiences, business networks and skills. These criteria are believed to be a secondary factor, if not non-existent, among the SOEs. It has been widely accepted that the directors and commissioner's appointments in SOEs are not based on merit but rather on the basis of political connections and "cozy" relationships between government figures and management. This is evident by the influence of the Ministry of SOEs in the board's appointment for which SOEs had the highest means, while private enterprises reported the lowest. This also reinforces the findings of previous studies (Robison, 1986; Mardjana, 1993) .
The findings provide support for the notion that privatization lessened the scope for political influence and interference by government in the decision-making process and appointment of company boards. This is consistent with one of privatization's rationales in developing countries, that is, giving more autonomy to management to manage (Cook and Kirkpatrick, 1988) .
Structural organizational changes resulting from privatization were found in this study. As firms moved from public to private, organizational structures tended to become flatter, more organic and decentralized, and to move to a matrix form of structure in order to facilitate organizational integration and fit with environmental factors. The respondents also reported improved communication and coordination among individuals and units following privatization as organizations moved towards reducing bureaucratic rules and rigidities. Notably, changes in organizational structure following privatization were not just seen as a continuous process; they were also seen to be multi-dimensional in nature (Erakovic and Wilson, 2005) .
First, the organizations significantly decreased their overall size. Most privatized firms reduced the number of employees and the size of organizational units. Next, those units or operations which were not considered part of the core business, or which were relatively unprofitable, were outsourced. Last, organizations reduced their number of Organizational change and performance hierarchical levels. Through various transitional stages, structures were flattened dramatically, leaving only four to five levels in operational areas. As noted previously, the organizational structure changes were to be anticipated. As privatized firms are subject to market pressures and are forced to become more efficient and cost effective, organizational structures that ensure faster decision making, eliminate layers of management and reduce bureaucratic rules are crucial. These finding provide evidence from the Indonesian context that flatter and more decentralized organizational structures are more common in privatized companies than in SOEs, thus supporting similar findings obtained in other contexts (Gowland and Aiken, 2003; Martin and Parker, 1997) .
Corporate performance
The respondents tended to be of the view that Indonesia's privatization program has had a positive effect on corporate performance. Respondents indicated that privatization had produced a significant increase in the overall profitability and quality of products/services as measured by competitive advantage in products design, after-sales and technical product/service capability. However, there was a greater tendency to significantly reduce the number of employees among privatized and SOEs than in private enterprises. Again, these findings from Indonesia generally support the findings of other researchers such as Yarrow (1986) , Megginson et al. (1994) and Martin and Parker (1997) . Martin and Parker found that performance improvements are associated with changes in the internal environment of the enterprises and, in some cases, these changes occurred independently of ownership changes.
First, as firms move from public to private, profitability (return on sales) increases. The mean rank for privatized firms recorded the highest, while public enterprises reported the lowest. Second, privatized firms had the lowest means rank with regard to the number of employment, while private enterprises reporting the highest. This implies that privatized firms had systematically experienced the decline in the number of employment following privatization. In the Indonesia's telecommunication industry, for example, after privatization employees were reduced from 42,170 employees in 1994 to 34,678 employees in 2002 (Telkom, 1994 (Telkom, , 2002 .
However, systematic reduction in the employment also occurred in the SOEs as part of business restructuring process in the government SOEs' revitalization program. Both SOEs and privatized had experienced staff redundancies as a result of privatization and government revitalization programs in the SOEs. Another factor contributing to staff redundancies is macro-economic instability resulting from the economic crisis unfolded in the mid-1997 whereby firms reduced the number of employment. Third, in relation to products and services quality, it is obviously shown that privatized firms had the highest mean rank and conversely, public enterprises reported the lowest.
Finally, the managerial perceptions relating to product and services quality significantly differ between privatized companies and SOEs. The management perception regarding products and services quality of privatized firms as measured by the competitive advantage in product design, after sales/services, technical product/services capability dimension were significantly higher for the privatized companies. Overall, the results suggest that the managers perceive that privatized firms tend to perform better than SOEs with respect to profitability and products and services quality.
Conclusions
The key finding of this study is that privatization brought about major changes in the organizational goals, corporate governance and organizational structure of privatized firms. These changes transformed privatized firms that fundamentally different from SOEs and suitable to a competitive market environment. These positive organizational changes led to significant performance improvement. Changes in ownership structure, from public to private, alter the behavior, incentives and performance of managers and organizations. The study contributes to our understanding about the relationship between ownership performance by providing an organizational change perspective on the examination of privatization-performance effect.
The findings highlight specific organizational changes that take place in the transition from the public to the private sector. As such, the findings could be used to prepare managers of SOEs to take steps to manage newly privatized firms. This finding reflects the importance of leadership and participation in the privatization and restructuring processes. This study highlights the need for human resource development management and training programs in all developing and transitional economies, targeting the managers of newly privatized firms (Metcalfe and Rees, 2005) . The content of that training and development could be informed by further research into the leadership and management challenges arising during the privatization and restructuring programs.
